The origin of the blackouts and insecurity in Ecuador is Correismo
The blackouts, insecurity and the huge foreign debt all have their origin in the policies of the Rafael Correa regime
You will say how can we continue to blame Rafael Correa for the problems that occur almost eight years after he left power, and seven years since his elected successor and supporter Lenin Moreno ceased to be his supporter.
Well, it's simple. The three main problems facing Ecuador today are electricity blackouts, insecurity and high public debt. And all three problems have their origins in Correa's regime and policies.
Blackouts
The immediate cause of the blackouts are the drought and reduced water flows at hydroelectric power plants.
Seven years ago, I warned about the risks that changes in rainfall and melting glaciers, as an effect of climate change, could affect hydroelectric generation.
I warned that as "glaciers melt and precipitation is reduced in certain areas of the Sierra, the flow of water that feeds them could be affected."
I said that since the Correa government had bet entirely on large hydroelectric plants (the "National Plan for Good Living" foresaw that 90% of electricity generation would come from this source), it was necessary to "develop plans and activities to mitigate the risks that these dams could be affected by changes in rainfall and water availability"; and also called for promoting other forms of renewable energy such as solar and wind.
But the problem does not stop there. The origin of the problem is also in Article 313 of the Correa’s 2008 Constitution, which reserves to the State "the right to administer, regulate, control and manage strategic sectors," including among these sectors "energy in all its forms, telecommunications, non-renewable natural resources, transportation and refining of hydrocarbons, biodiversity and genetic heritage, the radio spectrum, water."
Despite the fact that Lasso's government signed 10 renewable energy projects, these projects have not been able to start because the payment mechanism for the electricity generated by these private companies has not been defined, partly due to the opposition of the unions in the public electricity companies (also correista).
Insecurity
During the government of Rafael Correa, the conditions were created for the strengthening of the Organized Crime Groups (OCG):
· A FARC Congress was organized in Quito (2008)
· "Universal Citizenship" Allowed Criminals from Dozens of Nations to Enter Without Visas (2008)
· Elimination of the U.S. base at Manta (2009)
· The Anti-Drug Trafficking Intelligence Unit (UIES) of the Police was dismantled in 2009, and in its place the SENAIN, a secret police force to spy on political opponents, was created
· Agreement with the gangs "Latin Kings" (Aleaga) and "Los Ñetas" (Norero) in 2009; many of its members became part of the police, Armed Forces, etc.
· Purchase of defective Chinese radars and Indian helicopters (Ecuador did not have operational radars for eight years).
· Thousands of drug traffickers were pardoned
· An undersecretary of government, José Ignacio Chauvin, worked closely with the FARC and with the OCG of the Ostaiza brothers. The Ostaiza and the FARC claimed they contributed to Correa's campaign.
· Increasing control by the OCGs of prisons.
After the death of some capos such as alias "Rasquiña" and Norero, there have been clashes between different OCG to control territories, and these have been fragmented; this skyrocketed the homicide rate in Ecuador.
External debt
In December 2008, Correa's government declared a debt moratorium, not due to the inability to pay, but to manipulate the market (so much so that more funds were used to repurchase the bonds at a discount than would have been the planned debt service for that year). This triggered a higher country risk, and distanced Ecuador from international markets.
As oil prices fell from 2014 onwards, instead of reducing high public spending (44% of GDP in 2014), Correa's government began to borrow aggressively. Thus, public external debt went from $8 billion in 2009 (13.2% of GDP) to $32 billion in 2017 (32% of GDP). As of September 2024, public external debt corresponds to 39.5% of GDP (partly due to loans contracted as a result of the pandemic), although the average interest rate has decreased, given that currently a higher percentage of the debt corresponds to multilateral financial organizations (55.5% of the total).
My conclusion is that it would not be in Ecuador's best interest to re-elect those responsible for the origin of these three problems.